This dissertation explores how Cora Diamond’s moral philosophy can be read as a positive account of animal ethics. It departs from her critique of the reductionistic and rationalistic orientation of mainstream animal ethics (i.e., moral individualism). Although Diamond is one of the early figures of modern animal ethics, and one of the first critical voices of the pioneers in animal ethics, Peter Singer and Tom Regan, the full scope and force of Diamond’s moral philosophy has, with a few exceptions, not received much attention in animal ethics so far. The aim of this dissertation is to fully flesh out its potential.

My main argument is that a practice-oriented approach to animal ethics inspired by Diamond’s moral philosophy is superior to moral individualism as it properly captures how we as humans encounter moral issues in human–animal interactions. It takes seriously that moral thinking is situated, i.e., that it is possible and limited by where it comes from. Contrary to the reproach that practice-oriented approaches are not able to promote radical change in our dealings with animals, I will argue that our well-established practices and shared concepts provide rich resources to critically examine and change how we think of and treat other animals. This requires, as Diamond points out, a precise description and understanding of moral life and what is shared as morally significant in it. Contrary to moral individualism’s detached moral point of view, the approach developed here appreciates the variety and contradictions of moral thinking, particularly when it comes to our dealings with other animals.

To support this argument, I shall first show that rationalistic approaches to animal ethics fail to account for emotional responses and fail to represent how harm to animals can be properly accounted for. Second, I shall explore Diamond’s peculiar concept of animals as fellow creatures and how it relates to her claim that the concept of being human is crucial for moral thought. I shall show that Diamond invites us to re-imagine the seemingly unified concept of being human which allows for seeing animals both in their similarities with and differences to humans. Third, I shall defend that a situated view is to be favored over a detached point of view if we are to understand why we are touched by other animals’ lives in respect of their suffering. We take it as morally significant as it is mediated through our understanding of our own vulnerability. Fourth, I shall claim that taking practice as the starting point of critical reflection does not lead to moral conservatism but rather provides a foundation for radical critique by showing that the conceptual demarcation lines confining animals are not rigid. Finally, I shall explore the limits of moral thinking as discussed by Diamond and ethicists who argue, inspired by Wittgenstein’s last writings, for moral certainties. This final step shows that some chains of moral reasoning end with certainty, providing morality with an ultimately binding character.